Track 2: Regulation of Labour: Actors, Institutions and Law

Frederic Hüttenhoff, Institute for Work, Skills and Training, University of Duisburg-Essen
Claudia Weinkopf, Institute for Work, Skills and Training, University of Duisburg-Essen

» Full paper: ilera-2019-paper-144-Huttenhoff.pdf

The statutory minimum wage of 8.50 € in Germany had been introduced in January 2015 after more than a decade with very controversial debates. Moreover, in a couple of industries employer associations and unions have agreed upon sector-specific minimum wages typically far above the statutory minimum wages in Germany. In our paper, we raise issues of compliance and enforcement based on a review of the broad international literature on issues of compliance and enforcement of labour standards on the one hand and on findings of a 3-year qualitative research project funded by the Hans-Boeckler-Foundation (HBS) on the other hand (Bosch et al. 2018).

The Financial Control of Illicit Employment (Finanzkontrolle Schwarzarbeit - FKS) is responsible for monitoring the compliance with the statutory minimum wage and the higher minimum wages agreed upon in several sectors in Germany. However, there are repeated indications that the current control strategy and personal capacities of customs authorities are not sufficient to detect and penalize infringements effectively. It is also frequently critisized that employees in Germany still have to assert their wage claims at courts on an individual basis. Although the trade unions provide important support, this is completely lacking from the state. Experience at home and abroad shows, however, that the acceptance of minimum wages by companies is strongly influenced by whether they are effectively observed and enforced.

International studies on the strategies of supervisory authorities responsible for monitoring compliance with minimum wages have shown that strategic enforcement is important to achieve the largest and most sustainable changes in corporate behaviour with limited resources (Weil 2010 and 2015). The aim is to encourage leading companies to set and control internal standards that must be followed by subcontractors along the value chain (Hardy/Howe 2015). In addition, “cooperative enforcement” with an involvement of public, private and civil society actors and associations has proved to be more effective compared to separate enforcement solely by state authorities (ILO 2013; Amengual/Fine 2017).

Our qualitative study focused on three industries – construction, hospitality and meat processing. All three sectors have been included in the Act to Combat Illicit Work (Schwarzarbeitsbekämpfungsgesetz) and are subject to special monitoring by the FKS. Despite different conditions and structures, all three sectors face similar problems in terms of compliance with and enforcement of minimum wages. In particular, inaccurate information on working hours and unpaid overtime (as well as unpaid pre- and post-work) are important gateways for non-compliance with minimum wages. In addition, various deductions from wages, e.g. for "bad work", working materials or board and lodging, also prove to be recurring problems. In our paper, we will name approaches how the control, observance and enforcement of minimum wages can be more successful.

Literature

• Amengual, Matthew / Fine, Janice (2017): Co-enforcing labor standards: the unique contributions of state and worker organizations in Argentina and the United States. In: Regulation and Governance 11 (2):  129-142.
• Bosch, Gerhard / Hüttenhoff, Frederic / Weinkopf, Claudia / Kocher, Eva / Fechner, Heiner (2018): Kontrolle und Durchsetzung von Mindestarbeitsbedingungen: Einhaltung von Mindestlohnansprüchen am Beispiel des Bauhauptgewerbes, der Fleischwirtschaft und des Gastgewerbes. Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. Forschungsförderung Working Paper Nr. 95. https://www.boeckler.de/6299.htm?produkt=HBS-007033
• ILO (2013): Labour inspection and undeclared work in the EU. LAB/ADMIN Working Document No. 29. Geneva. https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/275/
• Hardy, Tess / Howe, John (2015): Chain Reaction: A Strategic Approach to Addressing Employment Non-Compliance in Complex Supply Chains. In: Journal of Industrial Relations 57 (4): 563-584.
• Weil, David (2010): Improving Workplace Conditions through Strategic Enforcement: A Report to the Wage and Hour Division. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022185618765551
• Weil, David (2015): Strategic Enforcement in the Fissured Workplace. John T. Dunlop Memorial Forum. Harvard Law School.

Florian Spohr, Ruhr University Bochum
Simon Ress, Ruhr University Bochum

» Full paper: ilera-2019-paper-161-Ress.pdf

This contribution scrutinizes how the 2015 introduction of a general minimum wage in Germany impacts on German trade unions’ membership by applying a difference-in-differences model on entries in and withdrawals from DGB affiliated unions.

The introduction of the statutory minimum wage in Germany in 2015 was a deep intervention in the autonomous negotiation of wages and working conditions by the trade unions and employer representatives. The ‘Act on the Strengthening of Free Collective Bargaining’ (Tarifautonomiestärkungsgesetz) was implemented in order to guarantee a decent hourly wage for the employees on the one hand and – according to its name – to strengthen the social partnership.

Trade unions welcomed the introduction of the statutory minimum wage and claimed it as a success of their mobilization efforts, which is remarkable regarding that until the early 2000s they rejected a statutory minimum wage because of its undermining effect on their claim to be the exclusive agent of workers’ interests. However, at least since the so called Hartz-reforms were taking effect in the mid of the 2000s, the low-wage sector enlarged rapidly and all efforts to strengthen the position of the unions in this sector could not substantially improve the working conditions and payments in some segments of the labour market. Without the power to directly exert pressure on the employer representatives in collective bargaining, the unions widened their repertory and started to advocate the introduction of a general statutory minimum wage in Germany. This action conflicts not only with the principle of autonomous wage setting by social partners, but also with the narrative that unions focus merely on their members’ benefits because the union density among workers who earned less than the proposed minimum wage was marginal.

This contradiction is resolved in a wider view according to which unions recognized that their (potential) members called increasingly for a statutory minimum wage as a political project. Thus, unions incrementally realigned their interest towards the introduction of a minimum wage in order to increase their attractively for old and new members in a time of decreasing number of trade unionists.

In consideration of the positive expectations of the unions regarding to the impact of their support of the minimum wage on membership development, the question arises if the empirical data matches these expectations. This paper seeks to answer this by the investigation of the patterns of entries in and withdrawals from unions of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB) before and after the introduction of the general statutory minimum wage. Based on representative data from the panel ‘Labour Market and Social Security’ (PASS), a conditional logistic difference-in-differences propensity score model is used to isolate the effect of the minimum wage introduction on the fluctuation of union members.

Overall no causal effect of the introduction is found for the probability of leaving a union by people in the low-wage sector. However, a causal effect on the probability of entering a union is detected. The new minimum wage law reduces the likelihood by about half for employees in this sector. Based on this results, this study reveals that unions’ support for the minimum wage did not increased their attractiveness for the workers who directly benefited of its introduction. Contrary the odds to strengthen their position in this segment of the labour market decreased.

Toralf Pusch, Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans-Böckler-Foundation

In comparison to other European countries, Germany has one of the largest low-wage sectors (Deutscher Bundestag 2017). Currently, about 22% of employees work in the German low wage sector (Kalina / Weinkopf 2018). Against this background and the declining collective bargaining coverage since the 1990s, the minimum wage was introduced on 1 January 2015 after years of political discussion. Nonetheless, the minimum wage is a low wage. In the year 2019, too, the statutory minimum wage of € 9.23 remains below the low-wage threshold in Germany, which currently can be assumed to be between € 10.50 and € 11.00. In this respect, it is not surprising that there was hardly any decrease in low-paid employment as a result of the introduction of minimum wages (Kalina / Weinkopf 2018).

Although the statutory minimum wage in Germany probably did not lead to a lower prevalence of low-paid employment, this does not mean that the minimum wage had no distributional effects. Results for Germany so far have mainly considered hourly wages. Significant increases in hourly wages were found at the lower end of the wage distribution, although not all workers entitled to the minimum wage were yet able to reach it (Amlinger et al 2016, Burauel et al 2017, Pusch 2018). However, the distributional effects of the statutory minimum wage on monthly income and household income must be distinguished from its effects on hourly wages. Firstly, reductions in working hours dampened the impact of hourly wage increases on monthly wages (Caliendo et al. 2017b). In addition, even rising monthly wages cannot be directly linked to rising household incomes, for example if the introduction of minimum wages has lead to job losses. In addition, the tax and levy system (for example, decreasing social incomes) in the case of rising monthly wages may cause household incomes to rise less then monthly wages (OECD 2015, p.50, Manning 2013, Dube 2017).

Currently, there is no comprehensive study on the effects of the statutory minimum wage on household incomes in Germany. Noteworthy are the results of Bruckmeier and Becker (2018) who found a slight decline in the risk of poverty among employees in sectors with a high minimum wage incidence, especially in eastern Germany. However, the measured effects are not robust across all specifications and not always significant. Related to the question of the effect of the minimum wage on the risk of poverty is the question of the effect of the minimum wage on the number of “Aufstocker”, which earned a low wage income in addition to the remuneration Hartz IV benefits. While Bruckmeier and Becker (2018) found hardly any effects, Schmitz (2017) could find slight reduction in the number of posts due to the minimum wage. On the other hand, income losses may be incurred on the entrepreneurs affected by the introduction of minimum wages - especially the self-employed with few employees (Döhrn 2014). Descriptive findings (Mindestlohnkommission 2018) and causal investigations (Bossler and Hohendanner 2016, Bossler et al., 2018) do not indicate a relevant effect of the minimum wage for the number of self-employed persons. However, Bossler et al. (2018) found a negative impact on the profit situation in the firms affected by the minimum wage.

While the influence of the statutory minimum wage on the distribution of household incomes in Germany has so far not been studied extensively, international literature offers more results. Part of international research focuses on the impact of minimum wages on risk of poverty, with mostly minor effects being shown (Belman and Wolfson 2014, Dube 2017, Neumark and Wascher 2008, Card and Krueger 1995, Manning 2013). However, distinguishing the question of the impact of minimum wages on the risk of poverty is the effect of minimum wages on the general distribution of household incomes. As stated by the OECD (2015, p. 49), many minimum-wage recipients do not live in poor households. A clearly positive effect of minimum wages on household incomes has been shown for the US in a recent study by Dube (2017). In addition, Dube (2017) cites 13 other studies for the US that show predominantly positive elasticities of poverty risk and / or household incomes with respect to minimum wage variations (e.g., Card and Krueger 1995, Addison and Blackburn 1999). Neumark et al. (2005) is the only contribution that marks a poverty-increasing effect of minimum wages. There are also indications for the UK of positive effects of minimum wages on household incomes (Cribb et al., 2018, ch. 6, Sutherland 2001). Similar to Germany, the effect of income increases linked to the minimum wage is dampened by the tax and levy system also in the UK (Brewer and De Agostini 2017, Brewer et al., 2009).

To test minimum wage effects on household incomes, Difference in Difference (DiD) estimates of household income are conducted for the years 2015…2017 using the PASS database supplied by IAB. For the estimations, two measures of relative minimum wage impact are being used in the sense of a robustness check. The first one is the regional depth of intervention of the minimum wage (state level). The second is the distance of the individual hourly wage from the minimum wage before its introduction. Spillover effects are checked in the latter specification and the control group is delineated accordingly. Other control variables, such as regional trends in economic development, are also added. In order to test the impact of the minimum wage on self-employment income, approximate estimates are made with measures of minimum wage impact on smaller holdings in the IAB Establishment Panel. The presentation of the causally interpretable effects is supplemented by descriptive findings and developments.

Peter Kerckhofs, Eurofound

Based on information from representativeness studies there is comparable information available for 40 of the 43 European Sector Social Dialogue Committees (ESSDCs). This comparative data will be presented in tables, figures and graphs.

In a first section the history of European sector social dialogue is presented. Milestones in this are the European Commission Decision of May 1998 and the European Commission staff working document of 2010. The proportion of the EU workforce presented in different ESSDCs, will be indicated here, just like the numbers of employees in activities not yet covered by ESSDCs.

The second part of the paper & presentation, will be the data from national trade unions and employers organisations in the different sectors. The degree of fragmentation and the sector relatedness will be presented and compared. For trade unions there is more fragmentation at national level. On average there are about 3 trade unions per country in a sector, while for the employers this is 2. At European level however there are 65 European employers organisations and a much less fragmented European Trade union landscape with 6 main European Sectoral Trade Union Organisations.

A third section will assess and compare the representativeness of European Social Partner organisations, in terms of the proportion of affiliated organisations and in terms of the proportion of EU member states where there is an affiliated member organisation.

Practices and processes in European sectoral social dialogue

Sabrina Weber, Pforzheim University
Barbara Bechter, Durham University Business School
Manuela Galetto, University of Warwick
Bengt Larsson, University of Gothenburg
Tom Prosser, Cardiff University

Background

Research on the European sectoral social dialogue (ESSD) has highlighted two aspects. First, that there is a huge variance between the existing 43 sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDC) (Degryse, 2015; Keller and Sörries, 1998) which is often attributed to certain sector-specific characteristics (de Boer et al., 2005; Leisink, 2002). Second, ESSD has been characterized as a multilevel setting where coordination efforts not only between social partners, but also within the respective organisations with a wide range of (national) actors must be achieved (Keller and Weber, 2011; Keune and Marginson, 2013). However, where and how exactly “the sector” makes a difference in this multilevel setting is largely unclear.

We open up the black box of sectoral practices and processes by investigating two SSDCs in more depth, namely Hospital (HOSP) and Metal (MET). The two SSDCs share a number of similarities – such as the establishment date of SSDC or the number and kind of European organizations involved (one single trade union, one single employer (not: business) organisation). Moreover, the two SSDCs have also managed to reach a similar number of joint texts. However, the focus of these joint texts differs: whereas the SSDC MET concentrates on industrial policy, the SSDC HOSP more closely considers  working conditions. Our paper therefore takes a micro perspective and investigates the practices and processes within the SSDCs, such as topic selection.

Argument

Our argument is twofold. First, we argue that it is useful to analyze SSDCs as a multilevel ‘network of organisations’ (Metcalfe, 1976; 1994) (represented by national and EU actors in SSDCs) that must ensure that the organisations participating in SSDCs develop capacities for working together effectively to produce desired outcomes. Modes of management/coordination in such networks may imply rules and procedures and the specification of output, or may be characterised by the formation of task forces and teams. Second, we advance the argument that such practices of coordination to achieve a desired outcome are shaped by (key) actors (Brass et al., 2004). In particular, in the multilevel setting of ESSD, national key actors define “the sector” and the sectoral practices by involving themselves in SSDCs.

Findings

We find that the management/coordination capacity of both SSDCs is high. However, the variance in output (focus) is reflected in different sectoral practices. Whereas the practices to reach the desired outcome in SSDC HOSP are characterized by horizontal coordination leading to a ‘problem-solving oriented social dialogue structure’, SSDC MET instead shows a rather hierarchical coordination approach (‘political management structure’). These differing SSDC practices are shaped by key national actors and we identify a very similar set of key actors (countries) in the two SSDCs.

Methodology

The paper draws on a range of qualitative data including interview and documentary sources at the national, EU and sectoral levels. First, qualitative data from interviews with social partner representatives and Commission representatives at the EU level in the sectors HOSP and MET.  A second source of data are selected joint SSDC texts, such as rules of procedure and working programmes. This data is completed by observations of SSDC meetings and, whenever appropriate, by national level interview data (e. g. where topic selection is mentioned).

References

• Brass DJ, Galaskiewicz J, Greve HR and Tsai W (2004) Taking stock of networks and organizations: a multilevel perspective. Academy of Management Journal 47: 795–817.
• De Boer R, Benedictus H. and Van Der Meer M. (2005) Broadening without intensification: The added value of the European social and sectoral dialogue. European Journal of Industrial Relations 11: 51–70.
• Degryse C (2015) The European sectoral social dialogue: an uneven record of achievement? ETUI Working Paper 2015.02. Available from: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2628064 [Accessed 4 May 2018].
• Keller B and Sörries B (1998) The sectoral social dialogue and European social policy - more fantasy, fewer facts. European Journal of Industrial Relations 4: 331–347.
• Keller B and Weber S (2011) Sectoral social dialogue at EU level: Problems and prospects of implementation. European Journal of Industrial Relations 17: 227–243.
• Keune M and Marginson P (2013) Transnational industrial relations as multi-level governance: interdependencies in European social dialogue. British Journal of Industrial Relations 51: 473–497.
• Leisink P (2002) The European Sectoral Social Dialogue and the Graphical Industry. European Journal of Industrial Relations 8: 101–17.
• Metcalfe L (1976) Organizational strategies and interorganizational networks. Human Relations 29: 327–343.
• Metcalfe L (1994) International policy co-ordination and public management reform. International Review of Administrative Sciences 60: 271–290.

Acknowledgement

The research for this paper was financially supported by the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Call for proposals: Improving expertise in the field of industrial relations. Project VP/2016/0092 (2016-2018).

New actors’ old problems?

Barbara Bechter, Durham University Business School

Background

The integration of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries into the European Union (EU) in 2004 has increased the level of heterogeneity and competition within it. Greater competition arises from the imbalance between economic and social standards in established Western European member states compared to CEE countries. In the absence of sectoral structures for social dialogue in many CEE countries, the capacity to fight regime competition and to mitigate downward pressures on social standards at the national level is limited. This study examines European sectoral social dialogue (ESSD) as a factor in establishing social standards and counteracting downward pressures on wages and working conditions in the EU. In the past, where cooperation occurred between social actors, it was strongly motivated by economic self-interest. This paper examines the role played by heterogeneous actors in the old and new member states since 2004 and their motivation to cooperate or compete with each other over the potential “losses” and “gains” of ESSD outcomes.

Argument

The overall purpose of this paper is to assess the interests of actors/social partners who represent both old and new member states in ESSD. The focus is on issues hampering integrative bargaining and the ability of actors involved to realize mutual gains through consensus. Similar to the unification of East and West Germany, we expect to observe not only a conflict between labour and capital about the distribution of social dialogue gains but also between old and new member states (Hyman, 1996).

It has been argued that policy issues tackled at the European level need to be of a consensual character in order to accommodate existing heterogeneity between actors (Keller and Soerris, 1998; DeBoer et al., 2005). Moreover, intended outcomes should be vague so that they are without legal effect and thus incapable of directing national policy choices and of disciplining competitive “beggar-my-neighbor strategies” (Scharpf, 2002). European sectoral framework agreements concluded after 2004 aim to supplement market integration for example by enabling transnational transport services or introducing EU-wide product standards (e.g. Silica, working time framework agreements) rather than establishing a minimum level of social protection (European Commission, 2018). We argue that the incentives for consensus decisions in ESSD are asymmetric, with strong rewards for cooperation in the old member states, in order to safeguard established standards, but incentives for non-cooperation in the new member states.

Functional arguments are used to examine and explain the contribution of different patterns of actor constellations to ESSD outcomes after enlargement of the EU. Particular emphasis will be drawn to the interdependency of actors in western and eastern Europe and the likely consequences of reaching consensus among actors.

Methodology

We base our analysis on a cross country comparison and develop a model mapping the motives of cooperation and preferences of trade unions and employers in western and eastern Europe over ESSD outcomes. Empirically we use data on actors involved in ESSD from Eurofound representativeness studies for 39 sectors and economic data based on Eurostat’s Structural Business Statistics for the EU-28.

Findings

Coalition building efforts and interest coordination between employers and trade unions in CEE are generally limited to the local context. Regional coalition building among likeminded trade unions and employers’ associations is rare with the exception of the Nordic countries. Multinational employers have taken advantage of the less regulated industrial relations systems and employer friendly taxation in CEE, together with lower labor costs and flexible labor markets (Bohle and Sadowski, 2010). The resulting asymmetric power structure is conducive to cooperation within national boundaries but detrimental to cooperation between trade unions across the east and west and does not promote an interest in shared EU policies. Thus for trade unions, ESSD is not seen as the “harbinger” of social integration but an instrument to defend local labour relations (Hancké, 2000).

Acknowledgement

The research for this paper was financially supported by the European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion. Call for proposals: Improving expertise in the field of industrial relations. Project VP/2016/0092 (2016-2018).

References

• Bohle, D. and Sadowski, D. (2010). Transnationale Unternehmen und Gewerkschaften in Osteuropa. Industrielle Beziehungen/The German Journal of Industrial Relations, pp.119-122.
• De Boer, R., Benedictus, H. and Van Der Meer, M. (2005). Broadening without intensification: The added value of the European social and sectoral dialogue. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11(1), pp.51-70.
• European Commission (2018) Social dialogue text database. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=521 [accessed November 2018].
• Hancké, B. (2000). European works councils and industrial restructuring in the European motor industry. European Journal of Industrial relations, 6(1), pp.35-59.
• Hyman, R. (1996). Institutional transfer: industrial relations in Eastern Germany. Work, Employment and Society, 10(4), pp.601-639.
• Keller, B. and Sorries, B. (1998). The sectoral social dialogue and European social policy: more fantasy, fewer facts. European Journal of Industrial Relations, 4(3), pp.331-348.
• Scharpf, F.W. (2002). The European social model. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 40(4), pp.645-670.

Sabina Stiller, AIAS-HSI, University of Amsterdam

This paper presents and reflects upon Germany’s approach to the regulation of flexible and new forms of employment. Looking specifically at solo-self-employment and platform-based work, it gives an overview of recent changes in legal regulation and the underlying policy agenda as well as describing the strategies of social partners in response to labour force flexibilization. Drawing on data from an ongoing comparative EU research project (NEWEFIN) on regulatory changes for new employment forms, it concludes that Germany currently follows a cautious and hesitant approach regarding these specific groups of workers. In parallel to an ongoing process of legal re-regulation of other forms of atypical work, trade unions keep opposing employers’ demands for flexible employment forms by seeking further improvements of working conditions and legal and social protection. Within this context, solo-self-employed and platform workers have certainly entered the agenda of unions, despite posing challenges compared to traditional firm-based members.

Labour-market practicality versus labour law rational?

Attila Kun, Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary

This paper deals with atypical forms of employment in Hungary such as cooperatives (school cooperative groups; social cooperatives) and active labour market programmes. They are used to offer cost-effective (subsidized), flexible, and customized labour force. They are unique non-standard forms of employment and based on pure labour market-oriented reasoning.

Can collective rights overcome the social protection gap?

Hanneke Bennaars, Leiden University

This paper provides an analysis of the regulatory framework applying to platform work in France. This regulation is still incomplete and fragmented. The paper looks into workers’ employment status, the formal relationships between clients, workers and platforms, the access to social protection, and the organisation and representation of platforms workers.

Comparative evidence from Europe

Marta Kahancová, Central European Labour Studies Institute (CELSI)
Mehtap Akgüç, Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS)

Labour market segmentation and a growing diversification of work structures affected the whole European Union in the past decade. Besides regular employment, diversification of work structures involves various non-standard and often precarious forms of employment. Great innovations in the field of digitalization are however pushing the diversification of work yet in another dimension where non-standard employment is increasingly shifted to various online ‘collaborative platforms’. The collaborative economy refers to “business models where activities are facilitated by collaborative platforms that create an open marketplace for the temporary usage of goods or services often provided by private individuals.”

The platform economy (also known as on-demand economy) brings along new ways for thinking about the labour process and industrial relations. Since work regulation in the collaborative economy often falls outside the traditional regulatory repertoire of the labour law, this phenomenon raises interests to study how work is regulated and how workers’ interests are voiced in order to grant them employment protection and social regulation in the same quality as to workers in regular employment.

This paper addresses the above challenges in the work regulation and workers’ interest representation as part of social dialogue in the platform economy. We analyse how the quality of work of platform workers differs from regular workers; how traditional trade unions view and approach platform workers; and what initiatives unions or similar organisations bringing together platform workers (e.g. collectives, digital groups, social media groups and so on), next to other organisations (e.g., NGOs), initiated in order to raise awareness as regards the employment standards and protection of these workers and thereby contribute to overcoming uncertainty and fragmentations between various forms of work.

After conceptualizing platform economy, we engage in an empirical analysis of platform work and the (potential) role of trade unions and other collective organizations in platform economy in seven EU member states resembling a European diversity in industrial relations systems: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Spain and Slovakia. Original empirical evidence has been collected within an EC-funded research project, focusing on the field of (a) transportation services, i.e., Uber, (b) accommodation services, i.e., AirBNB and (c) microwork, i.e. Helpling. The empirical research is based on primary qualitative data collected via semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders including representatives of employees, employers, public authorities as well as platform workers themselves.

Our findings show that there is a diversity of platforms active in respective countries with a differing degree of expansion of respective sectors (transport, delivery, micro-task, accommodation, etc.) under study. For example, the platform work in transport sector is almost non-existent in Germany, while it is more developed and even regulated in the other countries studied under this research. The motivations to work for such platforms are mostly similar across countries and related to supplemental earnings next to the main job – yet, depending on the sector of activity, the dependence of workers on platform show variety across countries.

In terms of social dialogue, we also found a substantial variation in the context of platform work. France and Denmark seem to be the frontrunners in platform work given the contact between social partners, workers and the platforms. Platform workers in France in transport and delivery sectors even established unions, making it one of the first of its kind in Europe. Despite its smaller size compared to bigger counterparts such as France, Germany and Spain, Belgium has also put in place important regulatory framework (particularly on the fiscal side) when it comes to platform economy. The platform economy is also expanding in Eastern Europe (e.g. Hungary, Slovakia), but social dialogue is rather limited at this stage, yet traditional actors start looking for ways to represent platform workers and employers in social dialogue.

All in all, social dialogue in the platform economy appears to happen mainly at the sectoral level across countries in Europe. It also appears that platform economy presents both new opportunities for social partners to involve platform workers in social dialogue, but given the nature of the platform work, many challenges such as raising awareness in a diverse work setting, incentivising workers to join unions in a fast changing world of work and so on, still lie ahead.