Track 2: Regulation of Labour: Actors, Institutions and Law

Some (not so) known stylized facts

Bernd Brandl, Durham University Business School

Trust between employers and employees and their representatives, i.e. in the employment relationship, is usually seen in literature as beneficial for the efficacy of their interaction. The beneficial role of trust between the employee and employer side on the efficacy of their interaction is rooted in the beneficial role of trust in negotiation and bargaining situations in general. Although literature contains a reasonable amount of theoretical and empirical research on the reasons why trust can be high or low (or somewhere in-between) in different countries and companies relatively few stylized and generalizable facts have emerged because the majority of analyses focused on case (e.g. single company or country) studies. Furthermore, previous literature concentrated on trust from the employee side in the employer side, i.e. on trust in management, but very little research can be found on trust in the other direction, i.e. on trust of the employer side in the employee side. Even more scarce is research in mutual trust. On basis of a unique, large and comprehensive matched employee/employer data set which covers trust relationships at establishment level between the employer side, i.e. the management, and the employee side, i.e. employee representatives, this article not only gives an overview of how trust between the two side differs in different companies in different European countries, but also provides a systematic analysis of the factors which determine trust in the employment relationship.

Proposal of a field theoretical perspective

Nele Dittmar, TU Berlin

Research in social sciences often draws rather pessimistic conclusions on the perspectives for trade union action in Europe. Differences in union cultures and between industrial relations systems, adverse material interests and asymmetric power relations within a competitive European economy are found to be restricting factors. It is less common, however, to look inside a trade union and take account of power relations or different practices prevailing within the organization, which might also hinder or facilitate European action (see Rüb 2009 as an exception).

In this paper, I would like to propose a field theoretical perspective (e.g. Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992) on the possibilities for and obstacles to trade union action in Europe. From this perspective, which was so far rarely applied to industrial relations or trade unions (see however Meise 2014 and Pernicka 2015 as examples), an organization is neither seen as a means of rational actors to reach a specified goal, nor as determined by its environment. Rather, a field – and an organization-as-field – is conceived of as a power structure in which actors struggle over organizational goals and strategies. It is assumed, however, that these struggles can only be explained by looking at both, the power relations within the organization-as-field itself and the position of the organization in other fields (Bourdieu 2005: 205).

Drawing on a case study of the German services union ver.di , I would like to sketch out how power relations and “rules of the game” in the German and European fields of industrial relations as well as within the union itself influence ver.dis Europe-related work. This might help to draw a more differentiated picture of trade union action in Europe in two respects: on the one hand, it could bring to light Europe-related practices of unions, which are overlooked by a macro-level perspective; on the other hand, it might point to obstacles located within the unions themselves.

The German field of industrial relations has been characterized by a relative balance of power between the organizations of labour and capital and a prevailing logic of concertation until the beginning of the 1990s. Since then, however, power relations have shifted to the detriment of unions, one reason for this being European and international economic integration. Schroeder (2016) differentiates three different “worlds” of industrial relations in Germany by now. The regulatory capacity of unions, employers’ associations and collective agreements decreases drastically from the first (e.g. core areas of the public sector) to the third world (e.g. big parts of the private services sector) (Schroeder 2016: 378f.). With the changing power relations, the rules of the game are also increasingly contested. The logic of concertation is put into question and both unions and employers’ associations have re-oriented themselves to some extent away from a “logic of influence” towards a “logic of membership” (Schmitter/Streeck 1999).

At EU-level, most commentators feel that only a rudimentary field of industrial relations has evolved, including elements of a rather symbolic euro-corporatism (Bieling/Schulten 2002), characterized by an imbalance of power to the disadvantage of trade unions. While EU-industrial relations institutions are arguably generally less developed than in Germany, power relations and “rules of the game” still vary in different economic sectors and policy areas at European level.

The union ver.di which is itself very heterogeneous – it organizes employees from all three “worlds of industrial relations” and encompasses 13 departments responsible for different economic sectors – is embedded in complex power relations in national and European (and – to make it even more complex –international) industrial relations fields. Affected by developments within these fields, rules of the games and power relations within ver.di are also changing. One can observe a certain shift in priorities to practices more strongly oriented towards a “logic of membership” (see for example ver.di’s organizational development program “Perspective – ver.di grows”). Rüb and Platzer (2015: 180) see an explicit conflict between Europe-related work (in their case, work with European Works Councils) and ver.di’s current priority on winning and activating (new) members. However, there are departments in ver.di in which “Europe” is an integral part of day-to-day work. Representatives of ver.di’s transport department work in close cooperation with “their” European union federation and workers and their unions in the transport sector have been able to block several EU-regulations through intensive lobbying and mobilizations at EU-level. A representative of ver.di’s health and social services department speaks of times in which (s)he has invested 100% of her/his working time in European issues. And ver.di has played an important part in the European citizens’ initiative “Right2Water”.

The proposed paper will take a closer look at how these diverse Europe-related practices within the union ver.di could be better understood by taking into account shifting power relations and changing rules of the game within industrial relations fields at national and European level as well as within the union itself.

References

• Bieling, H.-J./Schulten, T. (2002): Reorganisation der industriellen Beziehungen im europäischen Mehrebenensystem. In: Industrielle Beziehungen, 9(3): 245-273.
• Bourdieu, P. (2005): The Social Structures of the Economy. Cambridge/Malden.
• Bourdieu, P./Wacquant, L.J.D. (1992): An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. Chicago.
• Meise, S. (2014): Organisation und Vielfalt. Modernisierungen der Gewerkschaftspraxis. Wiesbaden.
• Pernicka, S. (2018): Dynamiken von Macht und Gegenmacht in der europäischen Lohnkoordinierung. In: WSI-Mitteilungen 8/2015: 604-612.
• Rüb, S. (2009): Die Transnationalisierung der Gewerkschaften. Eine empirische Unter¬suchung am Beispiel der IG Metall. Berlin.
• Rüb, S./Platzer, H.-W. (2015): Europäisierung der Arbeitsbeziehungen im Dienstleistungssektor. Empirische Befunde, Probleme und Perspektiven eines heterogenen Feldes. Berlin.
• Schmitter, P./Streeck, W. (1999): The Organization of Business Interests. Studying the Associative Action of Business in Advanced Industrial Societies. MPIfG Discussion Paper 99/1.
• Schroeder, W. (2016): Konfliktpartnerschaft – still alive. Veränderter Konfliktmodus in der verarbeitenden Industrie. In: Industrielle Beziehungen, 23(3): 374-392.

The role of `shared values‘

Sabrina Weber, Pforzheim University
Barbara Bechter, Durham University Business School
Manuela Galetto, University of Warwick
Bengt Larsson, University of Gothenburg
Tom Prosser, Cardiff University

Background

We investigate the reasons behind engagement and cooperation in European sectoral social dialogue. By taking a closer look at two most similar cases of sectoral social dialogue committees (SSDC) with most different outcomes, we outline the role of ‘shared values’ to overcome diverging interests between trade unions and employer organisations, but also within these social partner organisations.

Argument

We argue that the intention to engage in SSDC depends on the relevance or importance of topics to (most) affiliates. When actors identify relevant topics of common interest and goal congruence (e. g. solving problems) within and between social partners, this increases the motivation to influence and tackle a certain topic in the SSDC and produce joint outcomes. Goal congruence is more likely when trade unions and employers are able to articulate their goals in terms of (shared) ‘values’ rather than conflicting ‘interests’ (Provis, 1996). We therefore argue that collaborative problem solving and consensus building is more likely if shared values are identified in a certain SSDC.

Methodology

We use secondary data and primary data in the context of our two cases, the hospital SSDC and the metal SSDC. Our secondary data includes joint social partner texts, work programmes, and meeting minutes. Primary data is made up of interviews with social partners at the national and the European level and observation of SSDC meetings. Where appropriate, we also include quantitative data (on the economic sector, on the 43 SSDCs) to inform our analysis.

Findings

Our findings support the assumption that cooperation is more likely to occur in more homogenous SSDCs with ‘shared values’. In the hospital sector, ‘patient safety’ and ‘quality of care’ represent such shared values that allow trade unions and employer organisations to work together to find solutions to staffing problems, high workloads, and stress at work. Values such as ‘quality of services/care’ are supportive of patient safety as well as the reasonable workloads and if workforce is sufficiently well-trained (EPSU, 2017). In the metal sector, ‘digitalisation’ (Ceemet and industriAll, 2016) has to some extent a similar standing, since it connects to both working conditions and competitiveness. However, in comparison with the quality of care in the hospital sector, digitalisation does not (yet) seems to have as strong relevance for all affiliates. Even more, by some digitalisation is seen as a bit of ‘advanced’ topic pushed for by pro-active organizations, large businesses from members states in which this is most topical.

References

• Ceemet; industriAll (2016) “The impact of digitalisation on the world of work in the metal, engineering and technology-based industries, by European sector social partners”. Available from: https://www.ceemet.org/sites/default/files/joint_statement_digitalisatio... [Accessed 17 December 2018].
• EPSU (2017) HOSPEEM-EPSU EU-funded project “Promoting effective recruitment and retention policies for health workers in the EU by ensuring access to CPD and healthy and safe workplaces supportive of patient safety and quality care” (2017–2018). Available from: https://www.epsu.org/sites/default/files/article/files/Summary-Informati... [Accessed 17 December 2018].
• Provis, C. (1996) Unitarism, pluralism, interest and values. British Journal of Industrial Relations 34(4), 473–495.

Banu Uckhan Hekimler, Anadolu University

According to the ITUC (International Trade Unions Confederation) Global Rights Index published in 2018, 65% of countries exclude workers from to establish or join a trade union, 81% of countries have violated the right to collective bargaining and 87% of countries have violated the right to strike. The report announced ten worst countries for working people as follows: Algeria, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Colombia, Egypt, Guatemala, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. Among these countries, only Turkey is from Europe. Therefore it is worth to find the answers for these questions: “How is the industrial relations system in Turkey?” and “How the union rights are violated by the government and the employers in Turkey?”

Turkey, as a candidate country in the EU integration process since the 1960s, is generally characterized by low union density, decentralized collective bargaining, and authoritarian state figure as well as hostile labour-employer and labour-state relations. The main actor in Turkish industrial relations system is the state. There was neither a bourgeoisie nor a working class in the European sense in the Turkish pre-Republican period. Therefore, all labour rights, gained in Europe through intense class struggle, were always given in Turkey by the state. The workers and employers, two important actors in the industrial relations system, were left behind and the state regulated labour relations unilaterally. This, though, led to detailed legislation non-existent in the European countries.

There are more than 100 trade unions, most of which are affiliated to five divergent and rival labour confederations (Türk-İş, DİSK, Hak-İş, Tüm-İş and Birlik-İş). Only 1.714.397 workers are unionised and the union density rate, which was 11,96 %, 12,18 %, 12,38 in 2016, 2017 and January 2018, respectively. However the collective agreements do not cover all the unionised workers, only 1 million workers are covered by collective agreements. In other words, the level of collective bargaining coverage is well below the level of union density in contrary to most of the EU countries. There are two major and controversial stipulations concerning authorisation: representation of at least 1% of the total number of employees in the industry concerned and representation of more than half of the total number of employees in the workplace concerned. These requirements were probably the most provocative challenges in Turkey to collective bargaining rights and to ILO Convention No. 98.

In Turkey, workers have right to strike only in the event of a labour dispute arising during negotiations for the conclusion of a collective agreement. Other types of strikes and industrial actions, such as political, general, solidarity and wild-cat strikes slow- down, work to rule, have been implicitly prohibited. The postponement of legal strikes, an accepted legal practice borrowed from the US Taft-Hartley Act, has also been a telling feature of Turkish industrial relations, particularly between 2014-2018 under the AKP government. The President may postpone the strike or lock-out for 60 days. Upon the expiration of the 60 day postponement period, the dispute should be settled by the Supreme Arbitration Board. Therefore strike or lock-out postponement is meant prohibition of strike or lock-out in Turkey. 9 extensive strikes has been postponed between 2014 and 2018. So it is possible to say that the state is busting the unions implicitly by strike postponements. Besides the state, the employers has some union avoidance policies. Dismissals, exploiting inter-union rivalry and abuse of strike ballots are among the most common union busting strategies.

In this paper, first the general framework of industrial relations in Turkey will be drawn, afterwards union avoidance polices of state and employers will be discussed by some recent cases.

Populist social promises and their impact on the labour market

Anna Piszczek, University of Lodz and Supreme Court of the Republic of Poland

Social intervention processes should focus on actions designed to further social activity and, consequently, active employment of persons who are at the risk of exclusion, yet have the potential to take up employment. For it is work that should be the source of welfare of individuals and families, and employment should substantially minimise the risk of poverty and exclusion. The contemporary paradigm of social policy should depart from the concept of welfare state (guaranteed employment, high benefits) and instead embrace the idea of full-employment state (furthering activity in the labour market, flexible employment, lower labour costs).

Gender equality, work-life balance, minimum income, old age income and pensions – these are four out of 20 key principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. The purpose of the European Pillar of Social Rights initiative is to deepen the social dimension of the Union and improve positive social convergence between the Member States. With regard to gender equality it stipulates that, e.g. equality of treatment and opportunities between women and men must be ensured and fostered in all areas, including regarding participation in the labour market, terms and conditions of employment and career progression. In respect of work-life balance the Pillar indicates that parents and people with caring responsibilities have the right to access to care services. With reference to minimum income it lays down that for those who can work, minimum income benefits should be combined with incentives to (re)integrate into the labour market. The European Pillar of Social Rights specifies that women and men shall have equal opportunities to acquire pension rights.

The shared responsibility for the implementation of the principles and rights laid down in the European Pillar of Social Rights rests with the EU institutions, Member States, social partners and other parties concerned. Therefore, it is expedient to look at the social policy administered in Poland in recent months in the light of the purposes of the European Pillar. Do the social policy tools help the excluded, or rather make them dependent on the sources of aid and discourage them from active employment? Do they pursue gender equality and high participation of women in the labour market?

In Poland, the main area of the state’s social activity in the last three years has been profamily policy dominated by financial activities subordinated to political purposes, i.e. the need to seize and keep power. The incumbent government has simply loosened the purse strings, which is easy to prepare and implement. The adopted solutions serve to preserve the traditional family model of working man and housewife, which is facilitated with generous maternity entitlements or benefits that compensate the possible abandonment of career in favour of the role of full-time mother/carer. By contrast, a fine-tuned policy of a real welfare state should combine direct benefits with infrastructural capital expenditures, first and foremost for care and education facilities that would provide quality social services: public nurseries, kindergartens, after-school activities, well-functioning after-school clubs, as well as care homes for senior citizens. Hence, the Polish government’s policy is a far cry from the European Pillar of Social Rights initiative which underpins equality of men and women.

Moreover, the social policy administered by the new government appears to be inconsiderate of the labour market. While only a labour market that is capable of providing well-paid and secure jobs can create the basis for common welfare of society. In Poland, low employment rate is still an issue. However, the government has not implemented any specific measures that would be conducive to its upturn, while such solutions as the "500+ Scheme" (approx. €120 per month for the second and subsequent child in family) or lowering of the retirement age make up a blueprint for an opposite effect. In the first place, they cause women in the economically productive age bracket to leave the labour market. Additionally, there is no reflection on the long-term effects of the running social schemes. The government is inconsiderate of what will happen to the families whose children have come off age and their income from the "500+ Scheme" starts falling to eventually reach zero. Nor do they see the issue of the return to the labour market after a break caused by withdrawal from active employment for the duration of raising children. Sadly, a part of the long-term unemployed will remain dependent on the social aid system. The second problem of the Polish labour market are low wages. The average pay is still around one-third of the average pay in West European countries, but the majority of workers do not earn even that. From the point of view of the interests of the young generation, more important than direct social transfers would be capital expenditures for education in poor areas, financial aid for gaining qualifications, support for entrepreneurs who create better paid jobs in impoverished areas, capital expenditures for public transport that would ensure fast and cheap commuting to places where jobs are available.

Notably, Poland is in the run-up not only to the European Parliament elections (May 2019), but to the national parliamentary elections (October/November 2019) and the prospective presidential elections (2020) as well. The outcome of the latest local elections in 2018 is indicative of the likely profound changes on Poland’s political scene. High turnout and landslide victory of the opposition coalition in large cities demonstrate that the ruling party’s primacy, notwithstanding the current support polls, is not a foregone conclusion. In the months to come we are likely to hear a plethora of social promises, the exact content of which is impossible to predict today. Suffice it to say, however, that of late the media have been reporting that the "500+ Scheme" is to be replaced with a "1000+ Scheme". It cannot be excluded that such promises will also be made by the opposition parties and we will witness a peculiar auction of populist promises.

From supportive to intrusive? Niklas Bruun, University of Helsinki

Roberto Pedersini, University of Milan

The paper presents an analytical framework based on the different roles and measures that states use to shape the scope and content of industrial relations and collective bargaining based on Bordogna and Cella (1999). After elaborating a typology of styles of state intervention, it applies it to the experience of a number of European Union countries since 2010 in order to investigate whether we are witnessing any relevant change. The analysis points to some evidence about a more interventionist stance and less autonomy of industrial relations, with a mixed outcome in term of the effectiveness of the new measures.

Isabelle Van Hiel, Ghent University

» Full paper: ilera-2019-paper-266-Van Hiel.pdf

Collective bargaining can only be an adequate means to defend an promote workers’ interests, if the resulting agreements are respected. Therefore, collective agreements must be made enforceable, also at the request of the individual worker. The individual worker must be able to claim  the substance of the agreement against his employer, although neither of them might be a party to the collective agreement.

In the past, different means have been  developed to achieve this goal. Some means were based on the membership of the worker to the signatory workers’ organisation. To cover all the workers in the workplace, signatory trade unions imposed  an obligation to be trade union member in order to be hired, or to become one when hired. Other means were grounded on the membership of the employer of the signatory employers’ organisation. Those systems of collective labour relations  demanded for the use of pressure on the employer to become member of an employers’ organisation, or to accede to the collective agreement signed by the employers’ organisation. Where no employers’ organisations existed or had been involved in collective negotiations,  the collective agreement was enforced by a requirement in the individual labour contract to apply the labour conditions set in the collective agreement. Eventually, in many countries, the process of collective bargaining was formalised and the government started to declare generally binding the content of the collective agreement. As a consequence of the declaration, all workers are covered, whether or not their employer is a member of an employers’ organisation.

The possibility to enforce the result of the process of collective bargaining, must be considered as an element of the right to collective bargaining, which in itself is an aspect of the freedom of association. However, this right has been challenged over the years, mainly by invoking the freedom of association. Increasingly, it is judged to comprise a negative aspect which aims to protect individuals against pressure to become a member of an association. Since its first recognition by the European Court of Human Rights, the negative freedom of association has been invoked several times. First, in Young, James and Webster, it has been used to oppose closed shops. Later, in Gustafsson, the pressure exerted by a trade union on an employer to become member of an employers’ organisation, or to enter into the collective agreement, was questioned. As the attempt failed, similar complaints were introduced before the European Committee of Social Rights and the EU Court of Justice. More recently, in Geotech Kancev, the previous efforts cumulated in the claim of an employer against the application of a collective agreements which was declared generally binding. In this contribution the facts and outcome of the case will be discussed, while placing it in the evolution of the negative freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining at European and international level.

Is it time for a u-turn in European policies? Does employment status matter for job quality?

Franz Eiffe, Eurofound
Matteo Avogaro, University of Milan

This presentation has been cancelled.

The differences in job quality among higher education graduates in Europe: A cross-national analysis of 17 countries

Jenny Julén Votinius, Faculty of Law, Lund University

The ageing of Europe’s population will have fundamental implications for the labour market. For labour law, the ageing population in Europe has brought to the fore questions on age discrimination and ageism, along with an urgency to enable and encourage employees to stay longer in the labour market before retiring. Starting from legislation and policies on EU and national level, this paper argues that collective bargaining may considerably contribute to realizing the prolongation of working lives, due to its unique ability offer tailor-made solutions. When it comes to older employees, this ability is particularly important, as the ageing workforce is a group that is characterized by an unusually high level of heterogeneity.

Collective bargaining for older employees takes place within a legal and policy framework where the ban on age discrimination in EU law and the agenda for active ageing in EU policy forms an important part of the background. As regards age discrimination, EU law feeds into national legislation in a very direct and specific way – not least through the CJEU’s case law on the Equal treatment (framework) directive 2000/78/EC. This is in contrast with the policy agenda on active ageing; although this agenda is strongly promoted by the EU, almost all the details are left to the Member States.

Many EU Member States have introduced at least some form of statutory regulation to promote extended working lives (Eurofound, 2013). Normally, statutory law provides the general framework, and in many cases also financial incentives, while the social partners to varying degrees contribute to the detailed design and implementation. In a number of countries, comprehensive tripartite agreements have been concluded to introduce longer working life strategies. This is the case in, for instance, Finland, Denmark, Belgium, Ireland, Germany and France (Claisse, Daniel and Naboulet , 2011). In some countries, such as France, Germany and Denmark, the social partners have also concluded sectoral-level agreements in the matter, beyond the statutory framework. The paper discusses such collective bargaining practices in relation to a number of measures that often are highlighted as key factors in the promotion of longer working lives: working conditions, work environment and work organization; workforce and career development; and age-awareness and attitudes in the workplace (Edge, Cooper and Coffey, 2017; Blackham, 2016).

Drawing on labour market research and using a number of national examples of collectively bargained solutions to promote longer working lives, the paper discusses how effective strategies to meet the challenges of an ageing workforce can translate into collective agreements and thus become a part of the everyday life in the workplace. The paper claims that there is an important unused potential in collective bargaining for targeting the situation of older workers, and suggests that it would be rational for both employers and trade unions to increase their engagement in the area of collective bargaining for older employees.
 

Use and effects on industrial action Influence of organisational citizenship behaviour on organisational effectiveness: Experiences from Indian banks

Åsmund Arup Seip, Fafo Institute for Labour and Social Reserach, Oslo

Use of wage committees for arbitration in labour disputes in Norway has roots far back. The Scandinavian labor congresses of the 1880s wanted to establish arbitration courts that could resolve labor disputes. While the Danes, by the turn of the century, had adopted arbitration to resolve disputes in working life, neither Sweden nor Norway had adopted a similar court system.

When a clearer understanding of the differences between disputes of interests and legal disputes was established through the use of collective agreements, arbitration became the normal way to handle legal disputes in Scandinavia and elsewhere, and labour court systems were institutionalized. However, from 1916 to 1922, the Norwegian government, with parliamentary support, started an extensive use of compulsory arbitration in disputes over wages. After the Second World War the government resumed this practice and established in 1952 a permanent wage board that could handle wage disputes. Since then, the government has regularly intervened on ad hoc basis with a peace duty in disputes of interests in the labour market. The National Wages Board will then settle the dispute by compulsory arbitration. The ILO and the Committee of Experts under The European Social Charter have criticized the Norwegian government on several occasions, arguing that the interventions have been violating the right to industrial action.

Despite the criticism from ILO and the Committee of Experts, state intervention in industrial action has a legitimate place in the Norwegian wage setting system. Both the social partners and the political institutions recognize compulsory arbitration as a mechanism to solve disputes in in the labour market, especially where “essential services” are involved. It seems therefor relevant to ask how this mechanism works, and why it is used. This article will examine the use of compulsory arbitration in labour disputes in Norway after 1990, and try to explain some off the effects of the mechanism on industrial action and public administration.